

Supplementary Online Materials

Section A: Results of the LITS II Models in Table 5 with Demographic Controls

The model of government approval in Table 5 includes demographic controls with random slopes. I do not present the results of those these variables in the main text of the paper because their effect varies across countries and so the coefficient captures the effect “on average”. Table A1 below shows the full results for Table 5 for interested readers.

Table A1: Full Model of the Effect of Income Losses or Using Coping Strategies on Government Approval (Hierarchical Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	Whole Sample	Whole Sample	No Job/ Income Losses	Yes Job/ Income Losses
Family Lost Job or Income	-0.276** (0.050)	-0.189** (0.047)		
Used an Active Coping Strategy		-0.241** (0.056)	-0.104 (0.105)	-0.313** (0.064)
Passive Strategy: Cut Staple Goods		-0.372** (0.113)	-0.384** (0.121)	-0.384** (0.132)
Passive Strategy: Cut Luxury Goods		-0.201* (0.091)	-0.199 (0.121)	-0.191 (0.097)
Passive Strategy: Cut Staple and Luxury Goods		-0.351** (0.085)	-0.294** (0.101)	-0.359** (0.103)
Tried to Borrow		0.014 (0.053)	-0.031 (0.078)	0.044 (0.056)
Applied for Welfare		0.023 (0.078)	0.026 (0.146)	0.014 (0.070)
GDP Growth, 2010	0.272** (0.055)	0.371** (0.043)	0.350** (0.048)	0.297** (0.043)
Level of Democracy	-0.070 (0.082)	-0.011 (0.064)	-0.022 (0.069)	-0.025 (0.065)
Age	0.018 (0.014)	0.010 (0.015)	0.012 (0.019)	0.004 (0.018)
Education	-0.034 (0.027)	-0.038 (0.026)	-0.057 (0.034)	-0.020 (0.024)
Female	0.135** (0.038)	0.138** (0.039)	0.153** (0.048)	0.102 (0.053)
Self-Perceived Wealth	0.146** (0.018)	0.136** (0.016)	0.136** (0.020)	0.133** (0.022)
cut 1	-1.527 (0.782)	-1.039 (0.628)	-1.319 (0.685)	-1.156 (0.641)

cut 2	0.095 (0.782)	0.599 (0.628)	0.383 (0.684)	0.458 (0.641)
cut 3	2.041 (0.782)	2.569 (0.628)	2.347 (0.684)	2.443 (0.640)
cut 4	4.803 (0.780)	5.361 (0.626)	5.213 (0.681)	5.165 (0.636)
Variance Component				
Country-Level Intercept	0.583	0.562	0.813	0.591
Income Directly Affected	0.033	0.026		
Active Coping		0.034	0.141	0.034
Gave Up Essential Goods		0.194	0.129	0.226
Gave Up Luxury Goods		0.137	0.228	0.116
Gave up Luxury/Essential		0.114	0.123	0.147
Tried to Borrow		0.038	0.066	0.034
Tried for Welfare		0.098	0.333	0.059
Age	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.004
Education	0.013	0.011	0.018	0.008
Female	0.014	0.015	0.008	0.031
Self-Perceived Wealth	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.007
N Countries	21	21	21	21
N Observations	18908	18908	7882	11026
Hierarchical Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (Two tailed)				

Section B: Specifying the National Economy in the LITS II Analysis: Controlling for Growth in Previous Years and for Alternative Economic Indicators

In the government approval models in Table 5 I control for the state of the macroeconomy by using the per capita GDP growth rate in 2010. Table A2 looks at alternative specifications of the macroeconomic context, using data from other years and other macroeconomic indicators. Only the growth rate in the year of the survey had a significant association with approval. Thus per capita GDP growth in the survey year is the macroeconomic variable I use in the paper.

Table A2: Government Approval and Macroeconomic Outcomes (Hierarchical Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Per Capita GDP Growth, 2009	0.006 (0.026)						
Per Capita GDP Growth, 2010	0.269** (0.061)	0.318** (0.063)					
Inflation Rate, 2009				-0.011 (0.070)			
Inflation Rate, 2010		-0.102 (0.067)	0.033 (0.075)	0.057 (0.088)	0.051 (0.076)		
Unemployment Rate, 2009						0.022 (0.111)	
Unemployment Rate, 2010		-0.009 (0.015)	-0.030 (0.019)			-0.052 (0.112)	-0.031 (0.018)
Level of Democracy	-0.074 (0.086)	-0.137 (0.099)	-0.246 (0.129)	-0.208 (0.134)	-0.206 (0.129)	-0.269* (0.109)	-0.275* (0.101)
Family Lost Job or Income	-0.276** (0.050)	-0.275** (0.050)	-0.279** (0.050)	-0.279** (0.050)	-0.279** (0.050)	-0.279** (0.050)	-0.279** (0.050)
Age	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)
Education	-0.034 (0.027)	-0.034 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.027)
Female	0.135** (0.038)	0.134** (0.038)	0.137** (0.038)	0.136** (0.038)	0.136** (0.038)	0.137** (0.038)	0.137** (0.038)
Perceived Wealth	0.146** (0.018)	0.146** (0.018)	0.145** (0.018)	0.146** (0.018)	0.145** (0.018)	0.145** (0.018)	0.145** (0.018)
cut 1	-1.599 (0.873)	-2.482 (1.087)	-4.127 (1.408)	-3.328 (1.372)	-3.302 (1.320)	-4.470 (1.022)	-4.528 (0.970)
cut 2	0.023 (0.873)	-0.860 (1.087)	-2.505 (1.408)	-1.705 (1.372)	-1.679 (1.320)	-2.847 (1.022)	-2.905 (0.970)
cut 3	1.969	1.086	-0.560	0.240	0.266	-0.902	-0.960

cut 4	(0.872) 4.731 (0.871)	(1.087) 3.847 (1.086)	(1.408) 2.202 (1.407)	(1.372) 3.001 (1.371)	(1.320) 3.027 (1.319)	(1.022) 1.859 (1.020)	(0.969) 1.801 (0.968)
Variance Components	0.593	0.608	1.294	1.181	1.172	1.277	1.288
Country-Level	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033
Family Lost Job or Income	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Age	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Education	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014
Female	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Perceived Wealth	0.593	0.608	1.294	1.181	1.172	1.277	1.288
N Countries	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
N Respondents	18908	18908	18908	18908	18908	18908	18908
Hierarchical Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (Two tailed)							

Section C: LITS II Analysis with Other Country Level Controls

Due to the limited number of country cases, I tried to keep the level 2 controls as parsimonious as possible. Yet to check the models' robustness, In Table A3 I adding other controls including a regional dummy for Eastern Europe, per capita GDP, and inequality. The models for inequality (estimated using data from Solt's (2016) database) required dropping Kosovo since there is no data for that case. For each variable I add it as a control to the government approval models in Table 5. Several additional variables that I would have added, such as government ideology and welfare state size, are simply missing for too many of these cases to be included.

The only country-level variable which had a significant effect on government approval in addition to the growth rate was inequality; consistent with Anderson and Singer (2008), governments who president over unequal societies tend to be less popular. Yet including that variable does not change the association between being affected by the crisis and government approval. I do not include this variable in the final analysis to keep the models focused on short-term economic swings.

Table A3: Government Approval in 21 Countries, Controlling for Alternative Country-Level Control Variables (Hierarchical Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	[1]	[2]	[3]
GDP Growth 2010	0.272** (0.057)	0.272** (0.057)	0.293** (0.055)
Level of Democracy	-0.062 (0.090)	-0.067 (0.093)	-0.148 (0.088)
Eastern Europe	0.199 (0.373)		
Log(Per Capita GDP, 2010)		-0.044 (0.385)	
Inequality, 2010			-0.067 (0.034)
Directly Affected by the Crisis	-0.276** (0.050)	-0.276** (0.050)	-0.190** (0.050)
Age	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)
Education	-0.034 (0.027)	-0.034 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.026)
Female	0.135** (0.038)	0.135** (0.038)	0.121** (0.035)
Perceived Wealth	0.146** (0.018)	0.146** (0.018)	0.147** (0.018)
Cut 1	-1.302	-1.677	-4.118

	(1.000)	(1.446)	(1.607)
Cut 2	0.320	-0.055	-2.447
	(0.999)	(1.446)	(1.607)
Cut 3	2.266	1.891	-0.465
	(0.999)	(1.446)	(1.607)
Cut 4	5.028	4.653	2.318
	(0.998)	(1.445)	(1.606)
Variance Component			
Country-Level Intercept	0.607	0.603	0.638
Directly Affected by the Crisis	0.033	0.033	0.030
Age	0.002	0.002	0.002
Education	0.013	0.013	0.011
Female	0.014	0.014	0.009
Income Ladder	0.006	0.006	0.005
Number of Respondents	18908	18908	18099
Number of Countries	21	21	20
Hierarchical Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (Two tailed)			

Section D: Is Economic Voting in the LITS II Different in Eastern Europe?

The LISS II dataset pools surveys from Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. This raises the question of whether data from these countries should be pooled. Initial work on economic-voting in the region raised the possibility that in Eastern Europe (1) economic voting is unique in that voters looked at the economy not as a referendum on the party in power but on the choice to emphasize markets over communism, with a weak economy leading voters to support communist parties regardless of their incumbency status (Tucker 2005) or (2) that economic voting would be especially common in the region because voters were hypersensitive to economic fluctuations given the weak party attachments they had (e.g. Roberts 2008, Tavits 2005). Yet Tavits suggests that these differences began to weaken as democracy matured; the articles reviewed by Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2008) suggest that traditional economic voting models work the same in new democracies as in old ones. In Table A4, I test whether the effect of growth was different in the old and new democracies and find no difference in growth's effect between the two regions. Given those results, I am not concerned about pooling data from Western and Eastern Europe.

Table A4: Is the Effect of Growth Different in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe? (Hierarchical Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	[1]
Per Capita GDP Growth, 2010	0.548** (0.162)
Eastern Europe	1.436* (0.601)
Eastern Europe*Growth	-0.260 (0.172)
Level of Democracy	-0.006 (0.084)
Directly Affected by the Crisis	-0.201** (0.048)
Used an Active Coping Strategy	-0.245** (0.051)
Used a Passive Strategy	-0.282** (0.079)
Age	0.009 (0.014)
Education	-0.031 (0.026)
Female	0.134** (0.038)
Perceived Wealth	0.139** (0.018)

cut 1	0.105 (0.980)
cut 2	1.735 (0.980)
cut 3	3.695 (0.980)
cut 4	6.478 (0.978)
Variance Components	
Country-Level	0.781
Affected by the Crisis	0.027
Active Coping	0.023
Passive Strategy	0.104
Age	0.002
Education	0.011
Female	0.014
Perceived Wealth	0.005
N Countries	21
N Respondents	18908
Hierarchical Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (Two tailed)	

Section E: Who Lost their Job or Income During the Crisis?

In the text I discuss the fact that while self-reported wealth at the time of the survey is negatively associated with having experienced a job or income loss in the two years prior to the survey, self-reported wealth from before the crisis is positively correlated with experiencing one of these losses, confirming that the crisis' impact was not primarily concentrated among the poorest and most vulnerable respondents. This analysis is in Table A5 below, which contains a binary logistic model of reporting one of the income losses outlined in Table 1 as a function of the economy in the two years prior to the survey, the measure of the respondents' current household wealth (measured on the 10-step ladder described in the text), the same question asking the respondent to look back 4 years ago at their economic position, and the other demographic variables in the survey. Individuals who were most likely to lose income tended to be educated and younger. Not surprisingly, individuals who have experienced a recent income shock report having lower incomes today. But those who had higher incomes 4 years prior to the survey were more likely to have lost income than were those who reported that they had been poor 4 years before the survey.

Table A5: Model of Who Lost their Job or Income During the Crisis, Controlling for Self-Reported Income (Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	[1]	[2]	[3]
Level of Democracy	0.034 (0.070)	0.008 (0.071)	0.019 (0.069)
Per Capita GDP Growth, 2010	-0.083 (0.050)	-0.081 (0.051)	-0.073 (0.049)
Per Capita GDP Growth, 2009	-0.044* (0.022)	-0.048* (0.022)	-0.041 (0.021)
Perceived Wealth at Time of Survey	-0.131** (0.008)		-0.263** (0.011)
Perceived Wealth 4 Years Prior to the Survey		0.022** (0.007)	0.181** (0.010)
Age	-0.182** (0.008)	-0.169** (0.008)	-0.190** (0.008)
Female	-0.021 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.025)	-0.022 (0.026)
Education	0.019* (0.009)	-0.019* (0.009)	0.013 (0.009)
Constant	1.234 (0.656)	0.850 (0.665)	1.132 (0.647)
Variance Component-Country	0.450 (0.118)	0.462 (0.121)	0.437 (0.115)
N Respondents	31,231	30,975	30,919
N Countries	30	30	30

Hierarchical Binary Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (Two tailed)

A similar pattern emerges if we measure wealth using an index of household durable goods (An additive scale of household wealth that counts how many items the respondent owns off the following list: a car, a second house, a bank account, a debit card, a credit card, a cell phone, a computer, access to the internet) to measure the accumulated wealth of the household. When using this measure, I add country fixed effects because some of the household goods will be more common in wealthier countries. But within countries, Table A6 shows the crisis tended to not cause income losses among the least affluent households but rather was more likely to affect those who owned more goods. The indicators of crisis exposure are not simple indicators of poverty.

Table A6: Model of Income Losses During the Crisis, Controlling for Ownership of Household Goods (Hierarchical Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	[1]	(SE)
Wealth Measured by Household Goods	0.030**	(0.007)
Age	-0.151**	(0.008)
Female	-0.007	(0.025)
Education	-0.022	(0.009)
Armenia	-0.014	(0.095)
Azerbaijan	-0.224*	(0.094)
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.481**	(0.095)
Bulgaria	-0.180*	(0.092)
Croatia	0.278**	(0.097)
Czech Republic	-0.909**	(0.093)
Estonia	-0.140	(0.094)
France	-1.053**	(0.095)
Georgia	-0.863**	(0.095)
Germany	-1.109**	(0.095)
Great Britain	-1.111**	(0.087)
Hungary	1.059**	(0.103)
Italy	-0.182*	(0.093)
Kyrgyzstan	-0.948**	(0.095)
Latvia	0.843**	(0.104)
Lithuania	1.865**	(0.128)
Macedonia	0.023	(0.093)
Moldova	0.164	(0.095)
Mongolia	-0.667**	(0.092)
Poland	-1.077**	(0.086)
Romania	0.495**	(0.095)
Russia	-0.201*	(0.085)
Serbia	0.872**	(0.091)

Slovakia	-0.891**	(0.092)
Slovenia	0.011	(0.095)
Sweden	-2.052**	(0.113)
Turkey	-0.107	(0.093)
Ukraine	0.171*	(0.087)
Kosovo	0.260**	(0.098)
Montenegro	0.347**	(0.096)
Constant	1.045**	(0.083)
Binary Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses		
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (Two tailed)		

Section F: Controlling for Coping Strategies Separately in the LITS II

As I model government approval in Table 5, I control for all the coping strategies in the same model while also controlling for whether or not the household experienced an income shock during the crisis because these variables are all correlated with each other and I am concerned about omitted variable bias. Yet the model specification in Table 5 raises the possibility that multicollinearity between these variables is making some of them be significant/insignificant artificially. Thus in Table A7 I control for each coping strategy individually, with and without the control for the direct income loss. The active and passive coping strategies remain significantly associated with government approval across specifications. Feeling compelled to try to borrow money approaches statistical significance when no other variable is controlled for, but this correlation becomes insignificant when a control for experiencing an income shock is added. This is further evidence that, once we control for changes in household income, feeling compelled to try to use safetynets has no additional effect on government support.

Table A7: Coping Strategies and Government Approval, Controlling for One Coping Strategy as a Time (Hierarchical Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Experienced a Job or Income Loss		-0.280** (0.029)		-0.183** (0.031)		-0.268** (0.030)
Active Coping Strategy	-0.259** (0.037)	-0.269** (0.037)				
Gave Up Essential Goods			-0.425** (0.053)	-0.370** (0.054)		
Gave Up Non-Essential Goods			-0.257** (0.038)	-0.202** (0.039)		
Gave Up Both Essential and Non-Essential Goods			-0.444** (0.038)	-0.371** (0.040)		
Tried to Borrow Money					-0.058 (0.031)	-0.035 (0.031)
Applied for Welfare					-0.057 (0.037)	-0.034 (0.037)
Hierarchical Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses. Model Additionally Controls for Gender, Age, Income, Per Capita GDP, and Level of Democracy. N Observations=18,908, N Countries=21 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (Two tailed).						

Section G: Interacting Job Losses and Coping Strategies in the LITS with Measures of the Economic Climate and Party System Fragmentation

The LITS survey pools data from 21 countries and the results in Table 5 look at the effects of the crisis in an average country on government support. While these coefficients are estimated with random slopes, several readers asked about whether the effect of these variables differed systematically across contexts. I explore two sets interactive models. First, I look at whether the effects of the personal economic variables are contingent upon the state of the economy in the survey year. In previous work I have argued that the most vulnerable respondents will have greater incentives to punish the government for downturns or reward him or her for the recovery (Singer 2013). Thus we might expect a positive interaction term whereby the gap between those who lost income or had to engage in coping strategies and those who did not have these negative experiences to shrink as the economy improves. An alternative possibility is that if those who lost jobs or income are shut out from the benefits of the recovery, then perhaps they have less incentives to reward the government for that recovery, which would imply a negative interactive relationship between growth and being affected. Second, I tested if the effects of negative personal economic experiences were weaker in countries where the party system was fragmented, following the clarity of responsibility hypothesis articulated by Powell and Whitten (1993) and extended by Anderson (2000). Specifically, I tested if negative reactions to income losses or to coping strategies were smaller in countries with fragmented party systems, using data on legislative fragmentation from Borman and Golder (2013). To simplify the analysis, I combine the two passive coping strategies into a simple dummy variable, but the results are consistent if they are analyzed separately.

First, the results in Table A8 test whether the effect of an income loss or using a coping strategy is different in countries where the recession was deepest. In a previous version of the paper, I found a significant interaction terms between the state of the national economy and the various effects of the crisis. These interaction terms became insignificant, however, when I dropped a control variable while revising the paper to the model specification used in the present draft. In results not presented here I also interacted these variables with the unemployment rate and found no consistent effects. Thus the effect of income losses or coping strategies does not differ systematically with the macroeconomic context.

Second, in Table A9 I look at whether the effect of job losses or income losses varied systematically across party systems. None of the results are statistically significant at conventional levels, which suggests that respondents did not take the party system into account when holding the government accountable for the effects of the personal financial crisis.

A third hypothesis that I would have explored in an ideal world is whether a strong welfare state cushions the effect of these negative personal experiences, but systematic data on welfare state data does not exist for the countries in this sample. As noted in the paper, exploring the cross-national differences in how respondents reacted to the crisis should be a project for future research.

Table A8: Interacting the Effects of the Crisis with the Growth Rate (Hierarchical Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	[1]	[2]	[3]
GDP Growth 2010 (Mean Centered)	0.275** (0.056)	0.288** (0.052)	0.316** (0.051)
Level of Democracy	-0.069 (0.082)	-0.048 (0.076)	-0.053 (0.076)
Experienced a Job or Income Loss	-0.276** (0.049)	-0.192** (0.048)	-0.193** (0.048)
Income Loss*Growth 2010	-0.013 (0.016)		
Active Coping Strategy		-0.237** (0.056)	-0.242** (0.053)
Active*Growth 2010		0.035 (0.019)	
Passive Coping Strategy		-0.283** (0.084)	-0.282** (0.076)
Passive*Growth 2010			-0.029 (0.020)
Tried to Borrow Money		-0.006 (0.050)	-0.005 (0.051)
Applied for Welfare		0.012 (0.076)	0.011 (0.077)
Age	0.018 (0.014)	0.006 (0.015)	0.007 (0.014)
Education	-0.034 (0.027)	-0.032 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.025)
Female	0.135** (0.038)	0.134** (0.038)	0.134** (0.039)
Perceived Wealth	0.146** (0.018)	0.141** (0.017)	0.140** (0.017)
Cut 1	-1.746 (0.197)	-2.026 (0.200)	-2.029 (0.196)
Cut 2	-0.124 (0.196)	-0.392 (0.198)	-0.395 (0.195)
Cut 3	1.821 (0.195)	1.573 (0.198)	1.570 (0.194)
Cut 4	4.584 (0.189)	4.361 (0.192)	4.359 (0.188)
Variance Component			
Country-Level Intercept	0.582	0.580	0.552
Experienced a Job or Income Loss	0.032	0.027	0.027

Used an Active Coping Strategy		0.035	0.028
Used a Passive Strategy		0.120	0.093
Tried to Borrow Money		0.033	0.034
Applied for Welfare		0.093	0.094
Age	0.002	0.003	0.003
Education	0.013	0.011	0.011
Female	0.014	0.014	0.015
Income Ladder	0.006	0.004	0.004
Number of Respondents	18908	18908	18908
Number of Countries	21	21	21
Hierarchical Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (Two tailed)			

Table A9: Interacting the Effects of the Crisis with the Effective Number of Parties (Hierarchical Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	[1]	[2]	[3]
GDP Growth 2010 (Mean Centered)	0.276** (0.059)	0.315** (0.054)	0.311** (0.054)
Level of Democracy	-0.072 (0.091)	-0.053 (0.084)	-0.056 (0.084)
Effective Number of Parties (Mean Centered)	0.025 (0.153)	0.056 (0.144)	0.025 (0.142)
Experienced a Job or Income Loss	-0.278** (0.050)	-0.193** (0.049)	-0.193** (0.049)
Income Loss*Number of Parties	-0.019 (0.042)		
Active Coping Strategy		-0.242** (0.054)	-0.242** (0.053)
Active* Number of Parties		-0.035 (0.050)	
Passive Coping Strategy		-0.282** (0.083)	-0.282** (0.084)
Passive* Number of Parties			0.016 (0.050)
Tried to Borrow Money		-0.006 (0.051)	-0.006 (0.051)
Applied for Welfare		0.012 (0.077)	0.011 (0.077)
Age	0.018 (0.014)	0.006 (0.013)	0.006 (0.014)

Education	-0.034 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.025)
Female	0.134** (0.038)	0.135** (0.037)	0.135** (0.037)
Perceived Wealth	0.146** (0.018)	0.140** (0.017)	0.140** (0.017)
Cut 1	-1.752 (0.200)	-2.029 (0.200)	-2.029 (0.199)
Cut 2	-0.129 (0.199)	-0.395 (0.199)	-0.395 (0.198)
Cut 3	1.816 (0.198)	1.570 (0.198)	1.569 (0.197)
Cut 4	4.578 (0.192)	4.359 (0.192)	4.358 (0.191)
Variance Component			
Country-Level Intercept	0.607	0.582	0.575
Experienced a Job or Income Loss	0.033	0.030	0.029
Used and Active Coping Strategy		0.030	0.027
Used a Passive Strategy		0.118	0.120
Tried to Borrow Money		0.033	0.034
Applied for Welfare		0.094	0.095
Age	0.002	0.002	0.002
Education	0.013	0.011	0.011
Female	0.014	0.013	0.013
Income Ladder	0.006	0.004	0.004
Number of Respondents	18908	18908	18908
Number of Countries	21	21	21
Hierarchical Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (Two tailed)			

Section H: Robustness Tests on the LISS Panel Data from the Netherlands

The results in the table confirm that changes in support for the government reflect changes in respondents' income during the crisis. I have done a series of models with alternative specifications to ensure that the results in Table 5 in the text are robust to the specific modeling choices I made. The most important involves the dependent variable. To ensure the trichotomous functional form for the dependent variable is not driving the results, in Table A10 I model changes in government support as the pure difference of those two variables. As the variables are on an ordinal scale, I model changes in them as an ordered logit. The significance tests for the changes in the income variables in Table A10 are consistent with those in Table 7 in the text where changes in levels of government support are trichotomized; the measure of logged income changes is even significant at conventional levels in one model in this specification. The functional form of the analysis is not driving the results.

Table A10: Δ Government Support in the Netherlands Modeled as a Difference Instead of a Trichotomy (Ordered Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	Δ Satisfaction with the Government		Δ Confidence in the Government	
Log(Δ Income)	0.047*		0.043	
	(0.023)		(0.023)	
Income Got Worse, Stayed the Same, or Improved		0.112*		0.103*
		(0.050)		(0.050)
Voted for the Prime Minister's Party in 2006	-0.294**	-0.292**	-0.321**	-0.320**
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Voted for a Coalition Partner in 2006	-0.165	-0.164	-0.141	-0.140
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)
Abstained in 2006	0.105	0.106	0.136	0.137
	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.143)
Education	-0.019	-0.019	-0.020	-0.020
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Age	-0.050	-0.050	-0.024	-0.023
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Female	0.099	0.100	0.142	0.142
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Cut1	-5.275	-5.270	-6.973	-6.966
	(0.374)	(0.374)	(0.749)	(0.749)
Cut2	-3.995	-3.990	-5.096	-5.089
	(0.292)	(0.291)	(0.372)	(0.372)
Cut3	-3.202	-3.197	-3.885	-3.878
	(0.271)	(0.271)	(0.291)	(0.291)
Cut4	-2.106	-2.101	-3.055	-3.048
	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.268)	(0.268)
Cut5	-1.078	-1.073	-1.983	-1.975
	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.256)
Cut6	0.319	0.325	-0.933	-0.925

Cut7	(0.255) 1.505	(0.255) 1.512	(0.252) 0.496	(0.252) 0.505
Cut8	(0.258) 2.581	(0.257) 2.588	(0.251) 1.701	(0.251) 1.710
Cut9	(0.267) 3.541	(0.266) 3.547	(0.254) 2.861	(0.254) 2.870
Cut10	(0.289) 5.012	(0.289) 5.019	(0.265) 3.827	(0.265) 3.835
Cut11	(0.391) 6.722	(0.391) 6.728	(0.291) 5.207	(0.291) 5.216
Cut12	(0.750) 7.416	(0.750) 7.422	(0.390) 6.917	(0.390) 6.926
Cut13	(1.031) 7.416	(1.031) 7.422	(0.749) 7.611	(0.749) 7.619
N	2,026	2,026	2,043	2,043
LR χ^2	22.68**	23.70**	22.30**	23.29**
Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed)				

I also tested whether the choice of how income was operationalized might be driving the results. In particular, I ensure that differentiating income swings above 1000 Euros from those that were smaller in magnitude are not the only reason that we observe this pattern by replacing the change in income variable with a trichotomous one for incomes got worse (-1), stayed the same (0), or got better (1) in Table A11. While the magnitude of the effect is somewhat smaller due to averaging large and small swings, this variable is significantly associated with changes in government support in one of the two models.

Table A11: Government Support in the Netherlands with Δ Income Modeled as a Trichotomy (Ordered Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	Δ Satisfaction with the Government	Δ Confidence in the Government
Income Got Worse, Stayed the Same, or Improved (All Increases/Decreases Treated the Same)	0.120* (0.061)	0.110 (0.061)
Voted for the Prime Minister's Party in 2006	-0.304** (0.107)	-0.332** (0.106)
Voted for a Coalition Partner in 2006	-0.174 (0.105)	-0.096 (0.106)
Abstained in 2006	0.059 (0.149)	0.126 (0.146)
Education	-0.015 (0.030)	-0.013 (0.029)
Age	-0.033 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.032)

Female	0.100 (0.083)	0.124 (0.083)
Cut 1	-0.977 (0.263)	-0.923 (0.262)
Cut 2	0.420 (0.263)	0.505 (0.261)
N	2026	2043
LR χ^2	18.31**	20.06**
Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed)		

Finally, to ensure that control variables are not driving the results, in Tables A12 and A13 I model changes in government support without any controls, with previous vote only, and with a variable measuring whether respondents' satisfaction with the national economy went up (1), stayed the same (0), or went down, with that satisfaction measured on a 1-10 scale. or the economic satisfaction variable. I did not include this variable in the paper due to endogeneity concerns, but wanted to show that the model is not dependent upon this choice. The estimated coefficients for the change in income variable vary only slightly across model specifications and in only one case does the significance test for the coefficient change based on the model specification. Across all of these specifications, changes in income during the crisis have a moderate but statistically significant association with changes in government support over this period.

**Table A12: Δ Satisfaction with the Government in the Netherlands with Different Subsets of Controls
(Ordered Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors)**

	Δ Satisfaction with the Government							
Log(Δ Income)	0.043 (0.024)		0.044 (0.024)		0.047 (0.024)		0.046 (0.025)	
Income Got Worse, Stayed the Same, or Improved		0.108* (0.051)		0.109* (0.051)		0.111* (0.052)		0.109* (0.053)
Voted for the Prime Minister's Party in 2006			-0.312** (0.107)	-0.311** (0.107)	-0.345** (0.108)	-0.344** (0.108)	-0.336** (0.109)	-0.335** (0.109)
Voted for a Coalition Partner in 2006			-0.188 (0.105)	-0.187 (0.105)	-0.167 (0.106)	-0.166 (0.106)	-0.159 (0.107)	-0.157 (0.107)
Abstained in 2006			0.086 (0.147)	0.088 (0.147)	0.036 (0.149)	0.036 (0.149)	0.020 (0.151)	0.021 (0.151)
Δ Satisfaction with the National Economy (Ordered)					0.645** (0.056)	0.644** (0.056)	0.643** (0.056)	0.642** (0.056)
Education							0.000 (0.030)	0.000 (0.030)
Age							-0.027 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.032)
Female							0.086 (0.084)	0.086 (0.084)
Cut 1	-0.815 (0.052)	-0.811 (0.051)	-0.920 (0.069)	-0.915 (0.069)	-1.158 (0.073)	-1.155 (0.073)	-1.157 (0.268)	-1.153 (0.268)
Cut 2	0.573 (0.050)	0.578 (0.050)	0.475 (0.066)	0.480 (0.066)	0.317 (0.069)	0.320 (0.069)	0.319 (0.267)	0.323 (0.267)
N	2,026	2,026	2,026	2,026	2,026	2,026	2,026	2,026
LR χ^2	3.25	4.47*	14.81**	15.97**	155.23**	156.03**	157.22**	158.01**
Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed)								

**Table A13: Δ Confidence in the Government in the Netherlands with Different Subsets of Controls
(Ordered Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors)**

Δ Confidence in the Government								
Log(Δ Income)	0.038 (0.024)		0.039 (0.024)		0.043 (0.024)		0.043 (0.025)	
Income Got Worse, Stayed the Same, or Improved		0.101* (0.051)		0.103* (0.051)		0.108* (0.051)		0.108* (0.052)
Voted for the Prime Minister's Party in 2006			-0.337** (0.106)	-0.336** (0.106)	-0.358** (0.107)	-0.357** (0.107)	-0.350** (0.107)	-0.349** (0.107)
Voted for a Coalition Partner in 2006			-0.108 (0.105)	-0.107 (0.105)	-0.078 (0.106)	-0.077 (0.106)	-0.068 (0.107)	-0.068 (0.107)
Abstained in 2006			0.152 (0.144)	0.154 (0.144)	0.125 (0.145)	0.128 (0.145)	0.104 (0.147)	0.107 (0.147)
Δ Satisfaction with the National Economy (Ordered)					0.498** (0.054)	0.498** (0.054)	0.498** (0.054)	0.498** (0.054)
Education							-0.003 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.030)
Age							-0.028 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.032)
Female							0.121 (0.084)	0.122 (0.084)
Cut 1	-0.863 (0.052)	-0.857 (0.052)	-0.949 (0.069)	-0.943 (0.069)	-1.117 (0.072)	-1.112 (0.072)	-1.076 (0.265)	-1.066 (0.265)
Cut 2	0.556 (0.050)	0.563 (0.050)	0.477 (0.066)	0.484 (0.066)	0.359 (0.068)	0.365 (0.068)	0.402 (0.264)	0.412 (0.264)
N	2,043	2,043	2,043	2,043	2,043	2,043	2,043	2,043
LR χ^2	2.56	3.91*	16.33**	17.67**	103.57**	104.77**	106.81**	107.99**
Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed)								

Section I: Correlates of Government in the Netherlands in 2009

The paper focuses on modeling changes in government support across panel waves. While that model specification was chosen based on my understanding of the vote choice literature in the Netherlands and the limited number of variables available in the survey, in Table A14 I confirm this basic model specification by looking at which groups had highest levels of support for the government in December 2009. While individuals who had supported the prime minister's party experienced the largest drops in support over time in Table 7, those individuals remained more supportive of the government in 2009 than were those who supported non-government parties or who had abstained. Individuals whose satisfaction with the national economy was either high or increasing were more supportive of the government. Then income is not correlated with support for the government when other demographic variables are controlled for, but educated and younger individuals tended to be more supportive of the government than were other respondents even when prior vote choices are controlled for. Thus I include these variables in Table 7 even though they ultimately end up not being significantly associated with *changes* in support for the government.

**Table A14: Correlates of Government Support in the Netherlands in 2009
(Ordered Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors)**

	Satisfaction with the Government, 2009		Confidence in the Government, 2009	
Voted for the Prime Minister's Party in 2006	0.599** (0.101)	0.906** (0.101)	0.673** (0.100)	0.923** (0.101)
Voted for a Coalition Partner in 2006	0.563** (0.098)	0.668** (0.100)	0.514** (0.098)	0.618** (0.100)
Abstained in 2006	-0.066 (0.131)	-0.297* (0.132)	-0.235 (0.131)	-0.389** (0.131)
Satisfaction with the Economy 2009/10	0.909** (0.032)		0.800** (0.030)	
ΔSatisfaction with the National Economy (Ordered)		0.347** (0.050)		0.257** (0.049)
Log(Income, 2009/10)	-0.022 (0.038)	-0.028 (0.038)	-0.024 (0.038)	-0.029 (0.038)
Education	0.093** (0.028)	0.160** (0.028)	0.097** (0.028)	0.153** (0.028)
Age	-0.025 (0.029)	-0.036 (0.029)	-0.054 (0.028)	-0.062* (0.029)
Female	0.104 (0.081)	-0.053 (0.082)	0.014 (0.081)	-0.118 (0.081)
Cut 1	0.816 (0.322)	-3.360 (0.295)	-0.170 (0.325)	-3.855 (0.301)
Cut2	1.554 (0.312)	-2.792 (0.282)	0.629 (0.310)	-3.227 (0.283)
Cut3	2.378 (0.309)	-2.195 (0.274)	1.509 (0.304)	-2.539 (0.272)

Cut4	3.331 (0.310)	-1.456 (0.269)	2.452 (0.305)	-1.775 (0.266)
Cut5	4.222 (0.315)	-0.774 (0.267)	3.253 (0.308)	-1.122 (0.264)
Cut6	5.470 (0.323)	0.154 (0.267)	4.399 (0.314)	-0.238 (0.262)
Cut7	6.961 (0.332)	1.357 (0.268)	5.682 (0.321)	0.830 (0.263)
Cut8	8.922 (0.346)	3.101 (0.277)	7.606 (0.332)	2.545 (0.269)
Cut9	11.121 (0.400)	5.161 (0.338)	9.840 (0.376)	4.649 (0.318)
Cut10	13.625 (0.786)	7.618 (0.755)	11.681 (0.556)	6.456 (0.517)
N	2,286	2,201	2,298	2,213
LR χ^2	1087.48**	205.45**	933.43**	195.98**
Ordered Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed)				

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